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Why the 2010 Equality Act does not make the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism redundant  
 
David Feldman and others have argued against the adoption of the IHRA definition of 
antisemitism by universities on the grounds that the 2010 Equality Act and university 
harassment codes render it redundant. This is to seriously misunderstand the 2010 Equality 
Act. The Act itself offers no guidance as to what constitutes antisemitism, so it is necessary to 
look for guidance outside it. The same consideration applies to university anti-harassment 
codes. The case for the necessity of the IHRA is put by Lesley Klaff, a senior lecturer in law at 
Sheffield Hallam University and Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism, 
and Derek Spitz, a barrister at One Essex Court Chambers who acted for the Campaign Against 
Antisemitism in the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s Investigation into Antisemitism 
in the Labour Party.  
 
Introduction 
The CST report Campus Antisemitism in Britain 2018-2020, published in December 2020, 
revealed a significant rise in antisemitic incidents affecting Jewish students, student societies 
and lecturers in the past two academic years, with the total number of incidents for 2019-20 
being the highest CST has ever recorded. This was despite the fact that the year was cut short 
by the Coronavirus pandemic.i It is because of this increase in campus antisemitism, and the 
reported failure of universities to recognise antisemitism in their institutions because of 
incomplete or inappropriate definitions, or even no definition at all, that the Secretary of 
State for Education, Gavin Williamson, wrote to all vice-chancellors in October 2020 imploring 
them to sign up to the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism by the end of the year. In 
doing so, the Secretary of State was supported by the Government’s Independent Advisor on 
Antisemitism, Lord John Mann, the Shadow Education Minister, Kate Green, Britain’s Jewish 
communal bodies, and the Union of Jewish Students.  
The response of British universities has so far been underwhelming. At the time of writing 
(mid-January 2021), only 48, among them Cambridge, Oxford and UCL, have adopted the 
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working definition out of 130. This is because there has been considerable pushback against 
IHRA’s adoption by some academics and some student societies on various grounds, including 
the often repeated and incorrect claim that the IHRA definition is a threat to free speech and 
academic freedom on campus.  
Another line of argument against the adoption of the IHRA working definition by universities 
has emerged since the publication on 29 October 2020, of the report of the investigation by 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission (the Commission) into antisemitism in the Labour 
Party.ii This line of argument, which has been advanced by Yair Wallach of SOASiii, David 
Feldman of the Pears Instituteiv, and Seth Anziska of University College Londonv, is 
misinformed. It claims that the damning findings of the EHRC Report about antisemitism in 
the Labour Party illustrate that the Equality Act 2010 (henceforth ‘the 2010 Act’) can be used 
to combat antisemitism in universities, making the IHRA definition redundant; and that in fact 
the use of the 2010 Act is far preferable to the use of the IHRA definition for this purpose 
because it safeguards all minority groups from discrimination, and therefore places the 
struggle against antisemitism within the broader context of the struggle against all racisms.  
The argument asserts that adopting the IHRA definition will not address structural racism in 
universities but will ‘privilege one group over others by giving them additional protections 
and in so doing will divide minorities against each other.’ This is not well founded. There is no 
reason why the recognition of difference entailed in formulating a definition of the particular 
form of discrimination under challenge should amount to privileging one group over others. 
In fact, the universities’ ability to recognise and respond to complaints of antisemitism will 
help them to discharge their Public Sector Equality Duty under the 2010 Act. Section 149 
provides that universities must have due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful 
discrimination, harassment and victimisation, and other conduct prohibited by the Act; 
advance equality of educational opportunity between students of different racial, ethnic and 
religious groups; and foster good relations between students of different racial, ethnic and 
religious groups, including by tackling prejudice and promoting understanding. 
The argument against adoption relies on an anti-racist universalism to argue against the use 
of the IHRA definition by universities. The argument is based on a misunderstanding of the 
2010 Act, and a misreading of the EHRC Report. We deal with each of these below.  




The 2010 Act is not a substitute for the IHRA definition; Both are needed 
One of the key findings of the EHRC Report was that the Labour Party had, through the acts 
of its agents, breached the 2010 Act, by committing unlawful harassment of its members 
related to race (Jewish ethnicity). ‘Harassment’, under the 2010 Act, means treating someone 
in a way related to a protected characteristic that violates their dignity or creates a hostile, 
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. The Commission found that the antisemitic 
conduct of two of the Labour Party’s agents amounted to unlawful harassment of its Jewish 
members.  
The Commission stated that to identify these unlawful acts as ‘harassment’, it had been 
necessary to apply the definitions contained in the 2010 Act and noted that the IHRA 
definition is not legally binding. This has been interpreted by some opponents of the IHRA 
definition as evidence, if not proof, that the 2010 Act can be used to tackle antisemitism in 
universities under the rubric of harassment without the need for the IHRA definition. Wallach 
wrote: ‘The legal foundation for the report is the 2010 Equality Act, which is general in its 
applicability to groups of protected characteristics (such as race and religion). The basis here 
is equality and the universal protection against racial discrimination and harassment. 
Furthermore, the report does not rely on the IHRA definition, which it states clearly is not 
legally binding. The Commission reached its damning verdict the (sic) based on general 
applicability of the 2010 Equality Act.’vi David Feldman, for his part, wrote that, ‘The damning 
verdict of the EHRC’s recent report on the Labour Party provided a clear demonstration that 
the universalist principles gathered in the Equality Act can be used to hold powerful 
institutions to account’ and noted that ‘Universities operate under the Equality Act; they also 
have internal policies and procedures designed to address discrimination, harassment and 
victimisation.’ He added that ‘Jewish staff and students deserve protection, but imposing the 
working definition will not secure it.’vii 
This line of argument that campus antisemitism can be fully addressed under the rubric of 
harassment using the 2010 Act overlooks the fact that before speech or conduct can be found 
to constitute ‘harassment’ on a protected ground, it is essential to know what that speech or 
conduct is, and why it is harassing. This requires a definition. The need stems from the 
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wording of the relevant statutory section on ‘harassment’ itself. Section 26(1)(a) of the 2010 
Act defines ‘harassment’ as ‘unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic’ 
[emphasis added]. The relevant protected characteristics include age, disability, gender 
reassignment, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation. Harassment itself is not 
made unlawful under section 26. It is only where the harassment is related to a particular 
protected characteristic that it becomes unlawful. There must be a sufficiently close 
connection between the act complained of and the protected characteristic. In the case of 
Jewish people, it is the ability to define the conduct complained of as antisemitic that provides 
the sufficiently close connection between the unwanted conduct and the protected 
characteristic. In the case of a different protected group, such as homosexuals, a definition or 
some other way of recognising homophobia would be necessary.  
Jews are protected under section 26 of the 2010 Act on the basis of ‘race’ (Jewish ethnicity) 
and ‘religion or belief’. In the case of alleged harassment based on Jewish ethnicity, the 
necessary assessments cannot be made without the ability to recognise antisemitic conduct 
and to understand why that conduct would be likely to harass someone who identifies as 
Jewish. Nothing in the 2010 Act or in the Commission’s application of the legislation dispenses 
with this need to know what antisemitism is. Yet nothing in the 2010 Act provides the 
necessary definition. The Commission quite understandably applied the statutory definition 
of ‘harassment’ without reference to IHRA. It would have been odd if it had done anything 
else. However, the ‘unwanted conduct’ it identified is not defined within the four corners of 
the legislation. The important point is that where harassment of Jewish people is concerned, 
the unwanted conduct is unwanted precisely because it is antisemitic conduct. The 
Commission recognised as much. 
To qualify as ‘harassment’ the conduct must, under section 26(1)(b), ‘violate the victim’s 
dignity or create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment’ for 
her. In deciding whether the conduct has had that effect, the decision-maker must take into 
account the victim’s perception under section 26(4)(a). This is a subjective test. The decision-
maker must also take into account the other circumstances of the case and whether it is 
reasonable for the conduct to have that effect under sections 26(4)(b) & (c). This is an 
objective test.  
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In making this determination, the decision-maker must consider the implications of various 
rights, such as freedom of expression, as set out in Article 10 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR). This is because, where possible, the 2010 Act must be read and applied 
in a way that is compatible with the ECHR, which was brought directly into UK law by the 
Human Rights Act 1998. Conduct should not be regarded as harassment, and no action should 
be taken on it, where this would breach the Article 10 rights of the person whose conduct is 
in issue, or of the organisation that is responsible for their actions. This will often require a 
delicate balancing of rights to be undertaken involving the legal concept of ‘proportionality’. 
It is important to note that the unlawful harassment section of the 2010 Act, like the highly 
context-sensitive IHRA definition and examples, needs to be sensitively understood and 
carefully applied. Context is critical in defining ‘harassment’ just as it is in defining ‘unwanted 
conduct’ as antisemitic: the need to exercise judgment cannot be avoided in either case. 
It is particularly important to understand the difference between expression that is 
antisemitic and expression that is merely offensive. Expression that is ‘merely’ offensive, 
provocative, or insulting is protected under Article 10 ECHR as free speech and the 2010 Act 
will not ordinarily seek to regulate that speech where none of the protected grounds under 
the Act are engaged. On the other hand, expression that is racist and amounts to a form of 
hate speech is not protected by the ECHR. It is considered to be incompatible with society’s 
fundamental values of tolerance, social peace, and non-discrimination.  
Racist expression has been found by the European Court of Human Rights to include 
antisemitic speech and conduct including Holocaust denial. And even where the speech, 
although antisemitic, nevertheless falls within the scope of the right to freedom of expression, 
it can still be restricted, as long as this is done in a proportionate manner. In short, ‘mere’ 
offense, provocation or insult is within the scope of the guarantee of free expression and will 
not generally engage the 2010 Act at all. Antisemitic speech, by contrast, will frequently fall 
outside the scope of the free speech guarantee altogether and no balancing of freedom of 
speech and equality rights will be required. But even where it does not fall outside the scope 
of the right altogether, antisemitic speech may still be regulated (through a balancing 
exercise), for example as ‘harassment’ under the 2010 Act.   
In sum, the reason the Commission found that the Labour Party unlawfully harassed Jewish 
members in relation to their race (Jewish ethnicity) under the 2010 Act was not because the 
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conduct complained of was ‘merely’ provocative, insulting or offensive. It was because the 
conduct complained of was antisemitic, which is the reason why it was related to a protected 
characteristic. The Commission was ‘satisfied that the antisemitic conduct had the effect of 
contributing to violating the dignity of a member … or contributing to creating an intimidating, 
hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment…’ Indeed, the antisemitic conduct 
the Commission identified in its Report was so egregious that it fell outside the scope of Article 
10 altogether (pp.29; 108; 110). 
As there is no guidance as to what constitutes antisemitism in the 2010 Act itself, it is 
necessary to look for guidance outside it. This is why the 2010 Act cannot, and has not, made 
the IHRA working definition of antisemitism redundant. Moreover, in the application by 
universities of their anti-harassment codes, as these follow the law, the same need for a 
definition of antisemitism applies.   
Two of the criticisms of the IHRA definition by those advocating the use of the EA 2010 to 
combat campus antisemitism are that, in the words of Feldman, first, IHRA is not a ‘precision 
instrument’ but a ‘niche widget’ and secondly, that its use will interfere with universities’ 
autonomy.  
However, IHRA is not meant to be a ‘precision instrument’ as much as a heuristic device or 
working tool that assists in identifying antisemitism and educating people about it. It should 
be evident from what we have already said that the 2010 Act is not a ‘precision instrument’ 
either: it is a complex piece of legislation that was passed to codify the law by bringing 
together all existing anti-discrimination legislation. The application of section 26 requires a 
consideration of context and an ability to exercise judgment at least as much and probably 
more so than does the IHRA definition. But unlike the IHRA definition, the 2010 Act cannot 
readily be understood and applied by university administrators who have no legal knowledge 
or training. This means that the Section 26 anti-harassment provision could not be used 
effectively to combat campus antisemitism without engaging the machinery of the law. This, 
however, would be counter-productive for both the university and the complainant: the use 
of lawyers is prohibitively expensive for most students; the allegation of antisemitic 
harassment would be made public, thereby threatening the reputation of the university; and 
the autonomy of the university would be compromised as the case would be removed from 
the university’s internal procedures. 
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In short, the 2010 Act cannot operate without a definition of the conduct it condemns. The 
2010 Act will regulate insults or provocations when they are related to a protected 
characteristic such as race (Jewish ethnicity), in other words, when they are antisemitic. 
Whether the insults and provocations are of that type requires a definition of antisemitism.  
The EHRC Report is consistent with the IHRA definition and attuned to Israel-related 
antisemitism 
As we have said, Wallach declares that ‘the report does not rely on the IHRA definition, which 
it states clearly, is not legally binding. The EHRC reached its damning verdict the (sic) based 
on general applicability of the 2010 Equality Act.’ This observation contains a little truth and 
a larger obfuscation. The regulator, upon whom statutory powers are conferred under the 
Equality Act 2006 to make findings of unlawful conduct under the 2010 Act will obviously do 
so by applying that legislation. The very nature and purpose of the investigation was to 
determine whether the Labour Party had breached the 2010 Act, which is why the whole 
report is framed around the EA 2010. The fact that the Commission was able to determine, 
by applying the 2010 Act, that the Labour Party had committed unlawful ‘harassment’ of its 
Jewish members should come as no surprise. To that extent Wallach’s observation that it did 
so is true, but it is trivially true. However, the observation incorrectly implies either that the 
2010 Act itself provides a definition of antisemitism or that the need for a definition has been 
rendered unnecessary. That is an obfuscation. Although the definition does not come from 
the 2010 Act, the Act cannot function without one. 
It was not necessary for the Commission to rely specifically on the IHRA definition of 
antisemitism to decide whether the Labour Party breached the Act, although it could have 
done so. It was unnecessary because the Commission was able to rely on the extensive 
guidance, analysis and materials provided by Professor Alan Johnson in his 21 March 2019 
report, Institutionally Antisemitic: Contemporary Left Antisemitism and the Crisis in the British 
Labour Party as well as on evidence and submissions by the complainants, the Campaign 
Against Antisemitism and the Jewish Labour Movement concerning the nature of 
antisemitism, together with mountains of examples. As the Commission noted, what it 
focused on ‘represents the tip of the iceberg’. This does not make the IHRA definition 
irrelevant. The Commission states on page 26 of the Report that its findings are consistent 
with IHRA; on page 125 that it ‘may have regard to the IHRA’s working definition of 
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antisemitism and associated examples...’; and on page 116 that the unwanted conduct meets 
the definition of ‘harassment’ and would also meet the IHRA definition and examples.  
The Commission’s discussion of the range and volume of antisemitic conduct across the 
complaint sample provides clear cut examples of antisemitism under the IHRA definition. On 
page 31 of the Report it records that it found evidence of ‘antisemitic conduct’ relating to 
social media comments that: ‘diminished the significance of the Holocaust; expressed support 
for Hitler or the Nazis, compared Israelis to Hitler or the Nazis; described a “witch hunt” in the 
Labour Party or said that complaints had been manufactured by the “Israel lobby”; referenced 
conspiracies about the Rothschilds and Jewish power and control over financial or other 
institutions; blamed Jewish people for the ”antisemitism crisis” in the Labour Party; blamed 
Jewish people generally for the actions of the state of Israel; used “Zio” as an antisemitic term, 
and accused British Jews of greater loyalty to Israel than Britain.’ None of these examples of 
antisemitism derive from or are defined in the 2010 Act and yet the Commission did not 
hesitate in calling them by their proper name.  
Similarly, Wallach is wrong to declare that ‘The ECHR Report sends a strong message. It 
illustrates that it is possible to tackle antisemitism without conflating it with criticism of 
Israel.’ The suggestion that IHRA is responsible for such alleged conflation is a frequently 
repeated charge. It remains untroubled either by the express stipulation to the contrary in 
the text of IHRA itself or by the dearth of evidence of such conflation. In any event, there are 
several references to Israel-critical speech in the Report which make the same distinction that 
IHRA does. For example, on page 27 the Commission states that ‘Art. 10 [ECHR] will protect 
Labour Party members who, for example, make legitimate criticism of the Israeli 
government…it does not protect criticism of Israel that is antisemitic’ and it adds in a footnote 
that ‘where we refer to legitimate criticism of Israel throughout the Report, we mean that 
criticism that is not antisemitic.’  
While much criticism of Israel will not be antisemitic, some is and will be. The concepts do not 
operate in hermetically sealed containers, as the Commission expressly recognises. On pages 
29 and 30 of the Report, the Commission discusses the 2015 incident involving Israel-related 
antisemitism of Naz Shah and Ken Livingstone’s support for her comments. The Commission 
found that Ken Livingstone’s conduct was Israel-related antisemitism that did not warrant any 
protection at all under the right to freedom of speech. Moreover, the Commission’s 
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discussion of the antisemitism that occurred on social media frequently, involves examples 
relating to the Israel/Palestinian conflict.  
The Commission’s discussion of the Macpherson Principle, by which all complaints of racism 
should, in the first instance, be recorded and investigated as such when they are perceived 
by the complainant, or a third party, as an act of racism, is consistent with the Commission’s 
recognition that antisemitism is often an Israel-related phenomenon. This is because taking 
the point of view of the complainant as the starting point allows for the possibility that an 
attack on Israel could amount to the unlawful harassment of Jews. In addition, the 
Commission found that responding to complaints of antisemitism by labelling them as fake or 
smears was a denial of antisemitism, which constituted unlawful harassment of Jewish 
members. This denialist narrative, increasingly well-known now as the Livingstone 
Formulation, is frequently related to Israel and is itself now a contemporary antisemitic trope. 
What the Commission actually did contradicts Wallach’s claim that in the two central 
complaints, the Commission simply highlighted ‘classic antisemitic tropes.’ 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the claim that the EHRC Report is proof that the 2010 Equality Act, rather than 
the IHRA definition, ought to be used by universities to tackle campus antisemitism, is 
seriously misguided. The EHRC Report made findings of unlawful harassment precisely 
because the ‘unwanted conduct’ in question was antisemitic. That unwanted conduct did not 
qualify for even a minimal level of free speech protection. It was so egregiously antisemitic 
that it fell outside the ambit of Article 10 altogether. The 2010 Act contains no definition of 
antisemitism but the approach the Commission adopted to identifying antisemitism is 
consistent with IHRA and its examples. The EHRC Report provides no warrant whatsoever for 
dispensing with the IHRA definition.  
Antisemitism in universities can only be tackled by establishing appropriate procedures within 
those institutions, and by encouraging students to report and challenge antisemitism where 
it exists, as recommended by the Community Security Trust in its December 2020 report. To 
do this, it is vital to have available an adequate and accepted working definition of 
antisemitism, such as the IHRA definition.  
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